Physicians finish training with a decade of clinical education and no preparation for the document that will govern the next several years of their working life. The agreement arrives from a group or a hospital system, is described as standard, and contains provisions that determine where the physician may practice after leaving, who pays a malpractice tail that can cost tens of thousands of dollars, and whether the compensation described in the recruiting conversation is actually guaranteed.
The Law Offices of Albert Goodwin reviews and negotiates physician employment agreements in New York City, for physicians and for the practices that employ them.
Most physician compensation has a base and a productivity component, and the productivity component is where the disputes are.
One constraint shapes all of this. Where the employer bills federal health care programs, compensation arrangements must be structured to fit an exception to the physician self-referral law and, where the intent analysis applies, the anti-kickback statute. In practice that means compensation should be set in advance, be consistent with fair market value, and not vary with the volume or value of referrals the physician generates, although productivity based on services the physician personally performs is generally permissible. A compensation term that seems unusually generous relative to the work is worth examining for this reason as well as for the obvious one. See Stark and anti-kickback compliance.
This provision is worth more money than most physicians realize, and it is frequently negotiable.
Malpractice policies are typically written on a claims-made basis, meaning they cover claims made while the policy is in force, not incidents that occurred during it. When employment ends, the policy ends, and claims arising from care already delivered but not yet asserted are uncovered unless extended reporting coverage, the tail, is purchased. Given the length of the limitations period for medical malpractice claims in New York, and the discovery rule that applies to certain claims, the exposure window is long.
The cost of a tail is commonly a multiple of the annual premium and can run well into five figures for higher-risk specialties. Contracts allocate it in different ways: employer pays in all circumstances; employee pays in all circumstances; employer pays unless the physician resigns without good reason or is terminated for cause; or the obligation phases out over several years of service. The last two are reasonable compromises and are obtainable.
Where coverage is written on an occurrence basis, no tail is needed, which makes occurrence coverage worth asking about even though it is less common. Also confirm the limits, whether they are shared or separate per physician, whether consent to settle is required, and whether the physician is indemnified by the employer for claims arising within the scope of employment.
New York has no statute banning physician non-competes, and legislation to ban non-competes generally has not become law. Enforceability is decided under the common law standard: a restraint is enforceable only to the extent it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public, and not unreasonably burdensome to the employee.
New York courts have enforced physician non-competes and have also declined to, and the analysis is fact intensive. Considerations that matter:
See non-compete defense and non-solicitation agreements.
Read these before the compensation section. What matters:
Ownership of intellectual property and of anything developed outside clinical hours. Assignment of the agreement, which matters enormously when a private equity backed platform acquires the group and the physician finds themselves working for a different organization under the same contract. Partnership track language, which is frequently aspirational and unenforceable unless it states the criteria, the timing, and the buy-in formula. Moonlighting restrictions. Requirements to maintain privileges at a specific hospital. And the integration clause, which extinguishes every promise made during recruitment that did not make it into the document.
We also draft and negotiate these agreements from the employer's side, where the priorities are enforceable restrictive covenants drawn narrowly enough to be upheld, compensation structures that satisfy the federal exceptions, clear termination rights, and protection of the practice's patient relationships and referral sources. An overbroad covenant that a court declines to enforce leaves the practice with nothing, which is why restraint in drafting is a practical matter and not a concession. See non-compete enforcement.
Physician agreements are more negotiable than they are presented as being, particularly on the tail, the covenant geography, the without cause notice period, and the treatment of earned productivity compensation on departure. Review costs a fraction of what a tail obligation or an enforced covenant costs. Send us the agreement and any recruitment correspondence, and we will identify what is standard, what is not, and what is worth pressing on.
Call the Law Offices of Albert Goodwin at 212-233-1233 for a consultation.
You can contact us by phone at 212-233-1233 or by email at [email protected].